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Equity and neutrality are distinct concepts in housing taxation and weak and strong tenure 
neutrality should be distinguished. When a tax system is tested for those criteria, the taxes paid by 
landlords must be included, as they affect the rents renters pay. This paper defines appropriate 
tests, applies them to a stylised tax system and simulates tax changes designed to restore equity 
and/or neutrality. It shows how the homeowner's implicit income should be computed for taxes to 
be fundamentally tenure neutral or equitable or both. And it shows the key role played by the 
differential in producing housing services under owner-occupation and renting. 
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The tax advantage to homeowners is traditionally measured by reference with full imputation of the 
implicit rent (e.g. Aaron, 1970). The implicit rent is taken to be the market rent for an equivalent 
dwelling, from which the homeowner should be allowed to deduct mortgage interest and operating 
costs. There are two problems with that approach, one practical and one conceptual. The practical 
problem is estimating the market rent for an equivalent dwelling, or the rent at which the 
homeowner could let his dwelling to a renter, or the rent a landlord would charge him for that 
dwelling. Sometimes national averages are used to eliminate quality differences, but the 'average' 
rental apartment is certainly of lower quality than the 'average' owner-occupied housing unit. 
The conceptual problem is simply that it is not clear why the market rent for the dwelling should be 
used to measure the homeowner's implicit income, and even less why he should be taxed on that 
basis. Feldstein (1976) challenged that view, so it is necessary to return first to basic principles of 
equity and neutrality of housing taxation. We do so in this paper, where we show how the 
homeowner's implicit income should be computed for tax purposes. 
A related branch of the literature examines the relative costs of owner-occupied and rental housing 
and their impact on tenure choice (e.g. Rosen and Rosen, 1980, Hendershott and Schilling, 1982). 
It generally concludes that personal income tax advantages can substantially favour home 
ownership (Rosen, 1984). In fact, that literature shows that the user cost for owner-occupied 
housing is a smaller proportion of the dwelling's price than the user cost of rental housing, but that 
might be offset by a premium for dwellings sold to owner-occupiers. The tax advantages could be 
capitalised in higher house prices (Capozza, Green and Hendershott, 1999). 
That literature yields no straightforward indication about the neutrality of housing taxation. Indeed, 
differences in user costs mingle differences in tax treatment and differences in production costs. In 
addition, there exists some confusion about the meaning of neutrality. Tenure neutrality is 
generally interpreted as equal costs for rental and owner-occupied housing, presumably of the 
same quality. Haffner (2003) provides an overview of the possible meanings of tenure neutrality, 
ranging from equal cash outlays by renters and homeowners to equal public spending for either 
mode. She concludes that equality of user costs is the appropriate concept: 'if user costs differed 
between tenures, they could be equalized, in order to remove any distortion of consumers' choice' 
(p. 84). In that interpretation, a public policy seeking tenure neutrality would iron out all differences 
in user costs created by housing and tax policy but also by market forces. Lundqvist (1986) goes 
even farther: 'A neutral policy would include legal measures to make tenure alike in terms of 
freedom of disposal and security of tenure. Systems of housing finance, and terms of repayment, 
would be structured in such a way as to neutralise the impact of ability to pay on household choice 
of tenure' (p. 16). Note however that he does not operationalise those concepts. 
We shall argue that such requirements go too far. They attempt to make all players equally strong 
where levelling the playing field and letting the best win is more conducive to efficiency. Instead, 
we shall define a tenure neutral tax and subsidies system as one that preserves the ordering of 
user costs – that tenure which is cheaper before tax is still cheaper after tax. Under certain  
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conditions, a stronger neutrality condition might be warranted – a tax system is strongly neutral if it 
preserves the absolute difference in user costs. 
When neutrality is carefully defined, it appears that it is not equivalent to equity: an inequitable tax 
system might well be neutral, by favouring that tenure which is already cheaper. An equitable tax 
system might not be neutral, if tenure choice depends on the absolute difference in user costs and 
taxes narrow that difference. 
Public finance analysts are familiar with testing the equity of a tax system for household categories 
by considering what incomes are included in the tax base and what deductions are allowed. They 
seldom consider the taxation of commodities, even when its incidence is higher prices. Indeed, it is 
held that these taxes are like consumption taxes, that all households bear them similarly in 
proportion of their consumption. That is not true for the largest item in most households' budget: 
housing. Taxes levied on the production of rental housing services – taxes paid by landlords – are 
not borne by homeowners. This paper shows that landlord taxation must be included in the 
examination of the equity and neutrality of housing taxation, and how to do so. 
Obviously tenure choice cannot be reduced to a comparison of user costs (Shelton, 1968), but it is 
a component of that choice that public authorities can influence, mainly through taxation. 
Numerous countries encourage home ownership through tax advantages. Some European 
authorities may appear less generous, as they tax an imputed income for the homeowner. This 
contribution will define the benchmark with which the tax systems ought to be compared in order to 
determine the generosity of tax advantages granted to homeowners. 
User costs depend on particular circumstances: the type of landlord, the terms at which he can 
borrow funds compared to the homeowner, the types of dwelling occupied, the length of residence 
and the holding period, the timing of purchase and sale over the real-estate cycle, the performance 
of the local housing market, and so forth. No tax system can be tenure neutral under all 
circumstances. Our goal here is to define a tax system that is fundamentally tenure neutral, i.e., it 
is tenure neutral when the economic differences between the two tenures are reduced to plain 
structural differences. 
2.  User Costs in an Intertemporal Setting 
The relevant cost in the comparison of housing tenures is the user cost. For the homeowner, that 
cost is commonly defined to include actual outlays – interest, operating costs, taxes – as well as 
components that imply no expenditure – tax savings, the opportunity cost of equity, capital gains or 
losses. For the renter, the user cost essentially corresponds to rent paid, possibly lowered by 
personal housing aid. It might seem that computing user costs is easy: just observe the 
relationship between rental rate and price of apartments that exist on the market and use it in the 
comparison. That is not sufficient, however, when one wishes to assess the incidence of taxation 
on tenure choice. Indeed, that assessment cannot be restricted to the taxes paid directly by the 
renter or the homeowner. As important are the taxes the landlord pays, if they are passed on 
through higher rents.  
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More careful analysis compares particular rental and owner-occupied units, selected to be 
comparable. Elsinga (1996) does so for the Dutch Randstad. She interviews households about the 
purchase price of their housing, which allows her to set up a sort of price index, as they bought 
their houses at different dates. The change in that index is a central component in her annual user 
cost of owner-occupied housing; so much that it dominates the comparison in user costs. During 
the first half of the 1980s, when house prices were stable, the user cost of owner-occupied housing 
was higher than that of rental housing. The strong rise in house prices during the second half of 
the 1980s exactly reverses the comparison. The mortgage interest rate also plays an important 
role in the comparison, as it affects only the user cost of owner-occupied housing.2 A surprising 
result of Elsinga's work is that rents do not reflect those changes in interest rates and real-estate 
prices: they grow perfectly monotonously in the Netherlands. She thus shows that homeowners are 
exposed to considerable risks, risks that landlords seem to absorb completely when they set rents. 
As a result, home ownership, just like common stocks, is an asset that can only be recommended 
to investors who calculate their returns over a very long horizon – or who do not care about true 
costs. 
User costs are generally computed year after year. It may then be more advantageous to own 
one's home in a certain year, when real estate prices grow and interest rates are low, and less 
advantageous the next year, when prices decline and interest rates rise. To obtain a general result 
on the relative costs of owner-occupied housing, one could compute the user costs over several 
years. Still, the date of purchase – peak or trough – would remain crucial. It is also essential to 
choose well when taking up a fixed-rate mortgage (the vast majority of mortgage credits in the 
Netherlands). 
In those comparisons of user costs, annual changes in real-estate prices and interest rates dwarf 
all other differences between renting and owning, notably tax differences. Nevertheless, landlords 
also bear those changes and they must certainly pass them on to their tenants. The competition 
among landlords and the comparison with other investments force them to do so. Apparently, it is 
sufficient for them to pass those costs over a long horizon. Certainly the homeowner computes his 
costs over more than one year, so that the comparison of annual user costs cannot explain tenure 
choice. 
We wish to develop here a model that makes it possible to compare user costs over long horizons, 
so as to evidence stable underlying determinants, such as taxation. That model describes the 
average user costs, without computing the mean of annual user costs. On the side of the 
homeowner, is resembles closely the usual models of user costs, including capital and operating 
costs. On the renter's side, the user cost corresponds essentially to the rent, but that rent is 
computed to reflect the landlord's costs (as in Shelton, 1968, and Poterba, 1990). We therefore 
admit that the landlord passes those costs on to his tenant in such a way that he earns his required 
return over the whole investment period (and not in one individual year). 
We assume that the household that considers buying or renting its home is the alter ego of the 
landlord. It rents or owns the same housing unit, has the same alternatives for investment and 
                     
2   Localisation has no great incidence for its part. Indeed, the evolution of prices is rather uniform over 
the different parts of the Randstad.  
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locates in the same tax brackets.3 It even pays the same price when buying the dwelling, because 
the seller cannot tell whether the buyer will rent it out or occupy it himself, so there is no 
capitalisation of tax advantages. 
That last assumption eliminates another possible difference between the user costs of renting and 
owning: differential price appreciation. Indeed, so long as rental and owner-occupied dwellings are 
on the same market, price appreciation must be the same. As a consequence, capital gains 
taxation only creates a wedge in user costs by being charged at the date of sale rather than on 
accrual. The longer the holding period, the lower the effective tax on capital gains, simply by 
deferral of taxes. In addition, capital gains tax rates are sometimes made to decrease for longer 
holding periods. Such capital gains taxation together with transfer taxes are a higher burden for 
shorter holding periods. Should that be included in the test of the tenure neutrality of the tax 
system? Our claim is that it should not. Indeed, that is a (deliberate) discrimination between shorter 
and longer holding periods, not between renting and owning. Only if it were proven that one tenure 
had fundamentally shorter holding periods should capital gains and transfer taxes be introduced 
into the test of tenure neutrality. 
One fundamental economic difference between renting and owning we shall allow for. That is 
different costs of producing housing services depending on whether a renter or a homeowner 
occupies the apartment, due for instance to management costs and faster depreciation for rental 
housing. We shall thus focus on differences between the costs of renting and owning that are 
introduced by the tax system and by 'production costs'. 
Obviously, landlords need not be the same people as homeowners, tax differences having the 
potential to encourage a certain specialisation. However, in the largest rental market of all OECD 
countries, that of Switzerland, 57.4% of all rental dwellings belong to individuals (2000 census). 
Even in that country, rental units are not the same as owned apartments: Among owner-occupied 
dwellings the share of single-family houses is 57% while that share is only 5% among rental 
dwellings (2000 census). Shelton (1968) saw the rental and owner-occupied markets as related 
though separated. Ten years later, White and White (1977) emphasised that rental and owner-
occupied housing are substitutes in supply, not only for developers but also for landlords who have 
the option to sell their dwellings to individual households, possibly the renters themselves. 
It is not quite correct either to ignore the impact of taxes on prices and quantities (except rents, 
landlords being assumed to pass housing taxes on to their tenants). At this first stage, however, 
we wish to concentrate on the tax system in partial equilibrium (as opposed to a general 
equilibrium with endogenous prices and categories of owners and renters). This is a common and 
quite acceptable approach when comparing two assets – owner-occupied and rental housing – 
that are not taxed that differently after all. 
                     
3    Those are assumptions similar to the setting of Giertz and Sullivan (1978), who compare a 
homeowner with an identical tenant who invests his equity in rental housing rented to a third party.  
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3.  The Users Costs of Renting and Owning 
When choosing tenure, a household endowed with wealth W compares, among other things, the 
cost of each solution:4 
K
O + T
O <=> R + T
R – OCF  (1) 
where K
O encompasses all operating costs for the owner-occupant (maintenance,5 repair, 
gardening, insurance, electricity, water, heating, property tax) as well as interest paid on the 
mortgage, T
O encompasses all taxes paid by the owner-occupant in direct connection with his 
dwelling, R is the rent he would pay on the rental market for the same dwelling, T
R designates 
taxes that are specific and related to renting, and OCF (opportunity cost of funds) is the income the 
household would earn from investing its wealth W in other assets than its own home. In place of T
R 
there could be an allowance for rents in the definition of taxable income,6 or, at this stage, any form 
of direct housing subsidy reserved to rental housing (in which cases T
R < 0). 
The terms on the left-hand side of condition (1) are the outlays for the household if it owns its 
home, whereas the terms on the right-hand side represent the costs of renting, reduced by the 
return on 'free' wealth. The user cost of rental housing (U
R) is usually defined as the rent, without 
deduction of income earned on wealth that would otherwise be locked in one's dwelling. Therefore, 
that income passes on the other side of condition (1) to truly become an opportunity cost of funds, 
part of the user cost of owner-occupied housing (U
O): 
U
R = R + T




O + OCF  (3) 
The homeowner could have invested his equity W in a financial asset that yields total return i for 
comparable risk and liquidity. He would have had to pay taxes T on that income. Replacing those 




O + iW– T  (4) 
The comparison of the tax treatment of owner-occupied with rental housing should not be tainted 
by differences of dwelling type. That is why R was defined for condition (1) as the rent the 
household would have to pay for the same dwelling if it were put up for renting. Equally, that 
comparison of tax treatment should not be tainted by the particular nature of the landlord. 
Therefore, we shall assume that the landlord for the rental option is a household identical to the 
                     
4   Price appreciation will be dealt with below. 
5   Spending for maintenance is assumed sufficient to prevent physical depreciation. 
6   Such allowances exist in four Swiss cantons out of 26, with the purpose of setting tenants on a more 
equal footing with homeowners. In one canton, all taxpayers are allowed to deduct from their taxable 
income that part of their annual rent (or imputed rent) that exceeds 20 percent of their net income, with 
a ceiling. Since imputed rents are set rather conservatively, it is essentially tenants who benefit from 
that allowance. In two cantons, tenants may deduct 20% of their rent with a ceiling. In one canton, 
tenants are allowed a fixed amount.  
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owner-occupant, using the same wealth to purchase the same dwelling at the same price 
(presumably the seller of the dwelling would not know whether the purchaser buys it for his own 
use or for letting). However, there are differences. The landlord faces his own set of taxes, denoted 
T
LL. More fundamentally, operating costs K
LL for the landlord may be different from those of the 
owner-occupant because they include management fees (manager, janitor) and because a rented 
apartment might wear faster and require more maintenance. There is not much evidence on those 
differences, probably because its sign is pretty obvious. The main argument was developed by 
Shilling et al. (1991): landlords cannot monitor and charge to their tenants all the damage they 
have done. The problem is to measure the consequences of that principal-agent problem because 
in the reference situation, that of owner-occupied housing, spending for wear and tear is 
undistinguishable from spending for home improvements. Thus, when Shilling et al. (1991) showed 
that single family houses occupied by renters depreciate faster than those that are occupied by 
their owner, that might simply mean that homeowners choose to spend more for maintenance, not 
that they have to. Harding et al. (2000), used similar data to show that highly indebted 
homeowners spend less for maintenance, which might indicate that maintenance spending 
depends more on the funds available than on the actual wear and tear.7 Thus, the data on 
maintenance spending and housing depreciation are not easily informative about underlying wear 
and tear. What is needed is data on spending required to maintain a dwelling at constant quality. 
Short of such data, we shall adopt the central principal-agent argument of Shilling et al. (1991): 
renters impose higher maintenance costs on landlords than homeowners would have to spend to 
maintain the constant quality of their dwelling. 
The landlord could have invested his equity W in the same financial asset as the renter, which was 
also used to determine the opportunity cost of funds for the homeowner. His arbitrage condition 
that defines the required rent R is therefore: 
R – K
LL – T
LL = iW – T  (5) 
Thus, the required rent is 
R = K
LL + iW + T
LL – T  (6) 
The required rent is equal to the production cost of housing services (operating and financial costs, 
including the required return on equity), augmented by taxes the landlord pays but reduced by the 
taxes he would have had to pay on his reservation investment. When the market rent is equal to 




LL + iW – T + T
R (7) 
If the market rent is equal to the required rent defined in (6) and the opportunity cost of funds for 
the owner-occupant is defined as in (4), then the difference in user costs is: 
                     
7   Harding et al. (2000) actually develop a different explanation for that result. They believe that highly 
indebted homeowners consider the option to default, in which case maintenance spending is of no 
advantage to them. They even develop a further idea in response to Shilling et al. (1991), that 
homeowners do not bear the full consequences of poor care and maintenance, just like the renters, 











The market rent is equal to the required rent under either of two opposite sets of conditions: perfect 
competition or effective rent control that forces landlords to lower their rents to the level of costs. In 
Switzerland, rent regulation applies that allows renters to challenge a rent that yields the landlord a 
higher than 'normal' return, which is defined as the reference mortgage interest rate plus a small 
risk premium. On market with free rent setting, it is an empirical question whether competition is 
sufficient to force landlords to pass their costs and cost savings on to their tenants. Blackley and 
Follain (1996) found, with the help of a dynamic econometric model for the United States' rental 
housing market, that a 10 percent increase in landlord costs has rents increase by 6 percent, but 
only after 200 years. After five years, real rents are only 1 percent higher and 1.7 percent after ten 
years. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) had even estimated a smaller impact on rents, of the order 
of 0.8 percent for a 10 percent shock. 
To save our assumption of rents equal to costs, we could argue that even if it takes a long time for 
production cost changes to translate into changes in rents and the translation is only partial, rents 
may still best be explained by production costs, provided they do not change too often. That 
defence is not necessary. Suppose that landlords earn a better than required return. Then, the 
homeowner missed the opportunity to earn that better return because he could have been a renter 
and used his equity to buy rental housing. The missed return is the landlord's income on the left-
hand side of equation (5). Using that value for OCF in equation (3), the user cost of owner-




O + R – K
LL – T
LL (9) 
This user cost of owner-occupied housing is not the same as in equation (4) when the landlord's 
arbitrage condition (5) does not hold. However, the difference in user costs would still be given by 
(8): just subtract (9) from (2) and see how R washes out. Thus, it is not necessary that rents be 
equal to costs for the difference in the user costs of rental and owner-occupied housing to reduce 
to the right-hand side of equation (8). 
To see the intuition behind this result, consider a situation where housing shortage allows 
landlords to charge rents that exceed their costs and earn an extraordinary return. The homeowner 
escapes the rise in rent that the renter must bear, but on the other hand he forgoes the option to 
earn that extraordinary return, his wealth being locked in his dwelling. Overall, he is indifferent to 
the rise in rents. 
Finally, the difference between the user costs of renting and owning depends on the difference in 
financial and other costs incurred in providing housing services, see equation (8). It depends not 
only on the taxes paid by the renter and the owner-occupant but also on the taxes paid by the 
landlord (T
LL). Thus, it is essential, when testing the incidence of the tax system on tenure choice 
(i.e. tenure neutrality) not to forget the taxes paid by the landlord as they add to the user cost of 
rental housing. If the costs of producing housing services are the same for rental and owner-
occupied housing, the difference in user costs reduces to a difference in taxes. Without taxes, the 
user costs of rental and owner-occupied housing differ by the production costs.  
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The difference in user costs is quite robust to the investment options assumed for the household 
that chooses to rent and to the relationship between rent and costs. Separate user costs are not. 
For most of the analysis to come, we shall use only the difference in user costs. Nevertheless, it 
will be necessary to consider the impact of taxes on the separate user costs, e.g. in assessing 
whether some tax solution encourages housing consumption or housing investment by lowering 
user costs. In that case, we shall retain the assumption that the opportunity cost of funds for the 
owner-occupant is given by the financial alternative and that rents are equal to the net costs for the 
landlord. Then, the separate user costs are those of equations (7) and (4). For later use, let us 
define benchmark user costs that obtain from these in the absence of all taxes (assuming that 
taxes have no impact on before-tax production costs): 
U
R* = K
LL + iW  (10) 
U
O* = K
O + iW  (11) 
4.  Reference Income for Tax Equity 
Well shall consider housing taxation from the point of view of neutrality but also of equity, defined 
simply as the condition that taxes paid reflect capacity to contribute. Capacity to contribute is 
generally measured by income. Suppose, however, that there exists a commodity that all 
households must buy, but it comes at two prices: a low price reserved to some households and a 
high price for all the others. Households that may buy the commodity at the low price have higher 
income available for other goods. Should capacity to contribute not take that advantage into 
account? We believe that it should. 
The commodity we have in mind is of course housing, which comes at one price as owner-
occupied housing and at another as rental housing. Owner-occupied housing is out of reach for 
many households. If it is a cheaper arrangement, for instance because K
O < K
LL, households that 
can benefit from it have higher capacity to contribute. Let us call 'available income' the income 
after housing costs. Consider the household that compares owner-occupation with renting as in 
equation (1). If it owns its dwelling, its available income is, in the absence of taxes: 
Y
O* = Y – K
O  (12) 
where Y is regular income. If the same household rents its dwelling and invests its wealth in 
financial assets, its available income is 
Y
R* = Y – R + iW  (13) 
It may be difficult to accept that taxes should depend on income reduced by optional consumption 
spending (for housing). Indeed, that approach should not be used to compare the taxes paid by 
two households in the same tenure that decide to spend different amounts for housing. It is only 
valid for examining how taxes discriminate between a renter and a homeowner when it is the same 
household occupying the same dwelling in two different tenures. This is the narrow sense in which  
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tax equity is defined here, with focus on tenure. Alternatively, the implicit investment income of the 
owner-occupant could be measured by market rent. We shall show that such an assumption leads 
to the same income differential between renting and owning. 
The difference in pre-tax available incomes is 
Y
O* – Y
R* = R – K
O – iW  (14) 
We obtain that the difference in available incomes is equal to the difference between the price the 
renter must pay for housing services and the cost of their production for the homeowner, including 
the opportunity cost of funds. One arrives at the same expression when assuming that owning 
ones home generates an implicit income equal to the rent the homeowner could earn by renting 
the apartment out on the market.8 
The household does not necessarily have the same available income whether it owns or rents its 
home, so equity does not require it to pay the same amount of taxes in both cases. However, it 
requires the household to pay the same amount of taxes in both tenures if available incomes are 
equal (horizontal equity) and to pay more taxes in the tenure that leaves more available income 
(vertical equity). We wish to add an additional condition: the available income that is higher before 
taxes should not be lower after taxes for that would amount to a marginal tax rate of more than 100 
percent on the production cost advantage of the cheaper tenure.9 A tax system that is equitable 
under those conditions leads to after-tax available incomes that are closer than before-tax 
available incomes. An equitable tax such as a proportional tax or progressive tax on the available 
incomes defined in equations (12) and (13) would lower the difference between available incomes 
in equation (14). 
The problem is that equation (14) does not represent the difference in available incomes before all 
taxes. It does not take into account taxes paid by the landlord. Because of those taxes, the rent R 
differs from the production cost K
LL  +  iW of rental housing services. Replacing its value from 






LL – T  (15) 
where T
LL  –  T is the difference in taxes the landlord pays when investing his equity in rental 
housing instead of the reservation asset. 
It is perfectly possible that the production cost is higher for rental than for owner-occupied housing 
services (K
LL > K
O), but that rental housing is a tax shelter (e.g. thanks to accelerated depreciation 
allowances), so that T
LL < T. In that case, the available income of the owner-occupant is higher 
than that of the renter in the absence of any tax (eq. (15)), but the renter could have greater 
income when the landlord's tax saving is passed down to him (Titman, 1982). A proportional 
personal tax on the available incomes of the renter and homeowner would narrow Y
O – Y
R. It would 
not return its sign back to its value before all taxes. Thus, a proportional personal tax that looks 
                     
8   We shall distinguish strictly between implicit income, which is income in nature assessed on the basis 
of market prices, and imputed income, which is income assessed by the tax authority. 
9   This is not so much a condition of equity as a condition of feasibility: no one would make the efforts 
required to earn higher income to end up with lower income after taxes.  
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perfectly equitable is no guarantee that the full tax system is equitable. In this example, it does not 
satisfy the additional condition for equity, as the income that is higher before tax is lower after tax. 
Clearly, the full set of taxes pertaining to housing must be included when testing tax equity 
between renting and owning. Again, it is unusual to include taxes comprised in consumption goods 
when assessing the equity of household income taxation. Indeed, one may generally admit that 
those taxes are born by all households equally. That assumption is wrong in the case of housing. 
Only the renter bears the taxes paid by the landlord, while the homeowner escapes them. 
Let us now define available incomes properly before all taxes (marked by *) and after taxes. We 
assume that rents are equal to the landlords' reservation rent (eq. (6)), that the investment option 
for the renter is the reservation asset, and that all costs and financial returns are unaffected by 
income taxation: 
R* = K
LL + iW  (16) 
Y
R* = Y – K
LL  (17) 
Y
O* = Y – K
O  (12) 
Y





O = Y – K
O – T














In the absence of taxes, the change in available income for a household that buys its rental 
dwelling (Y
O* – Y
R*) is equal to the difference in operating costs. 
If one does not like defining capacity to contribute after housing costs, one can try to define instead 
the homeowner's full income. That implies imputing some income for the equity he invested in his 
own dwelling. A market-based solution is to impute that income as being equal to the equivalent 
market rent for his dwelling minus production costs. In that case, the household's full income as a 
homeowner is (using eq. (6) for market rent): 
Y
O = Y + R – K
O – T
O 
     = Y + K
LL + iW + T
LL + T – K
O – T
O (22) 
while its full income as a renter is: 
Y
R = Y + iW – T – T
R  (23) 
The income difference is, therefore, the same as in equation (21) with full taxes and (20) in the 
absence of all taxes.  
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5.  Equity and Neutrality 
Taxation is equitable if it reduces the difference between available incomes between the tenures, 
but not so that the household (or team) that has higher net income before tax ends with lower net 















The difference in available incomes is equal to the difference in user costs (compare eq. (8) and 
(21)). The condition of tax neutrality with respect to tenure choice therefore resembles the 
condition for equity. In fact, only one of the equity conditions is relevant for the choice of tenure: 
taxes should not reverse the sign of the difference in user costs, or, put differently, the tenure with 















Neutrality allows imposing greater taxes on the tenure that has lower operating and interest costs. 
However, the difference in taxes should not be greater than the difference in those costs. Contrary 
to equity, it is perfectly compatible with neutrality to levy a heavier tax on the mode of tenure that 
already has higher production cost. 
Condition (25) is sufficient for the neutrality of housing taxation only to the extent that the choice of 
tenure depends on the sign of the difference in user costs as in condition (1). We shall say that 
taxation is weakly tenure neutral when it does not reverse the sign of the difference in user costs. It 
is quite possible, however, that tenure choice depends on the very difference in user costs, say 
because there must be a sufficient economic advantage to becoming a homeowner to justify the 
sacrifices needed to accumulate the required equity. To be strongly tenure neutral, taxation would 




O  (26) 
even when K
O ≠ K
LL. A tax system that is strongly tenure neutral is equitable only in a very weak 
sense, as the renter and the homeowner pay the same amount of taxes even when their incomes 
differ. 
We have made no distinction between households. If the user cost of one tenure is lower than that 
of the other, all households should choose the former. If they do not, it must be that they are 
influenced by factors that are not directly related to user costs. Those factors could be gathered in 
a personal minimum difference in user costs, Di, that would be required for household i to choose 
to own its home rather than rent it. Thus, household i chooses to own its home if U
R – U
O > Di. It 
rents its home if the contrary is true. With this approach, neutrality should be redefined as requiring 
that taxes do not change the sign of U
R – U
O – Di, i.e., this expression should have the same sign 
as  K – K
O – Di. One would therefore need personalised conditions for each household. If one 
wishes to dispense from that, neutrality must be strong.  
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Our definition of neutral housing taxation is not the only possible one. Haffner (2000) defines tax 
neutrality as a condition that owner-occupied housing be taxed like all other investment goods. 
That definition places the household's choice of how to invest its savings at the centre of the 
analysis. It requires quite naturally full taxation of implicit rents and taxation of capital gains in the 
same way as those on other assets. Our definition of tax neutrality emphasizes the household's 
choice of tenure. We shall see that full taxation of implicit rents is not required. We share with 
Haffner the focus on taxes and subsidies, leaving out land use and building code regulation, which 
also have an impact of housing costs but make no difference between tenures. 
6.  Neutrality and Equity of a Stylised Tax System 
The formulas elaborated in the previous sections allow us to test the equity and neutrality of any 
housing taxation system. We shall do so in this section, with a stylised system that reproduces the 
main principles applied in many European countries. It has elements, such as an imputed rent, that 
exist in 9 out of 20 OECD countries (in 1993).10 We also test a deduction or particular imputation 
for renters. 
The income tax is levied at the flat rate t.11 Thus, the return on the reservation financial asset is 
taxed as follows: 
T = tiW  (27) 
As a renter, the household may be allowed to claim a deduction D
R from his other income in 
connection with his rental contract. It is worth 
T
R = – tD
R  (28) 
The landlord is taxed on economic income reduced by supplementary deductions D
LL such as an 
allowance for energy-saving investments, accelerated depreciation or the permission to claim as 
maintenance some expenditures that increase in fact the value of the property. He pays taxes: 
T
LL = t(R – K
LL – D
LL)  (29) 
Replacing tax terms (27) and (29) into equation (6) of the required rent and solving that equation 
for a reduced form of R, which appears on both sides of the equation, we obtain: 
R = K
LL + iW – sD
LL  (30) 
with 









                     
10   OECD (1994). The other countries do not allow unlimited deductibility of mortgage interest paid. 
11   Flat rates have been found repeatedly to be good approximations of effective tax schedules when 
deductions are taken into account. For Switzerland, see Mottu (1997).  
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If only economic costs were deductible (D
LL = 0), the tax would be perfectly neutral, without any 
incidence on rents. That is a well-known feature of taxes on pure economic profit. The 
supplementary deductions D
LL lower taxable rents, which lowers the tax on rents, and so forth, 
hence the multiplier-type coefficient for D
LL in (30). 
For the homeowner, an estimated implicit rental income R
I is imputed for tax purposes for his use 
of his own dwelling, but he may deduct the interest paid and expenditures that maintain the value 
of the object from taxable income.12 He might also be granted supplementary deductions D
O 
similar to those of the landlord. If, on the contrary, not all of his expenses were deductible, say 
because there is a ceiling on interest deductions, then D
O would capture those non-deductibles 





O)  (32) 
In order to test the equity and the tenure neutrality of the stylised tax system, we need to compute 
the tax differential and compare it to the production cost differential for owner-occupied and rental 











                     = t(R
I – K




The second expression obtains when market rents are equal to required rents as in equation (30). 
It might be interesting to examine the impact of taxes not only on tenure choice but also on the 
choice of housing consumption or investment relative to other goods or assets. That will depend on 
the separate impacts of taxes on the user costs of rental and of owner-occupied housing. Using 
equations (7) and (10) for the user costs of rental housing with and without taxes and the 
definitions of taxes above, we obtain: 
U
R – U
R* = – sD
LL – tD
R (34) 
Similarly, we use equations (4) and (11) for the user costs of owner-occupied housing with and 





O – iW – D
O) (35) 
For ease of interpretation and without loss of generality, we shall from now on assume that 
operating costs are higher for rental housing (K
LL > K
O), as was argued in section 3. That implies 
that owner-occupied housing is the cheaper solution in the absence of all taxes. A tax system that 
is equitable and weakly neutral with respect to tenure choice reduces that cost advantage. A tax 
system that is strongly neutral leaves it unchanged. 
                     
12   Great Britain has used estimated rents for tax purposes from 1803 until 1963. Schedule A, the tax 
levied on income from land and buildings, taxed the imputed income of homeowners. In the years 
before abolition, the tax progressively lost its "bite" as rent estimations lagged inflation while 




The tax system narrows the difference in user costs if the tax differential of equation (33) is 







O)   (36) 
Thus, the tax system reduces the cost advantage of home ownership if the imputed rent is not 
farther below the market rent than can be justified by lower production costs and greater 
supplementary deductions for the landlord and the renter than the homeowner. 
More precise conditions for equity and neutrality can be found by aiming at a tax differential in 
equation (33) equal to the rate of tax multiplied by the income or cost differential. In that case, the 







which is equivalent to 
R
I – D
O = R – D
LL – D
R (38) 
Sufficient condition (38) for equity and weak tenure neutrality of the stylised tax system is satisfied 
for a number of configurations, among which the following might be easiest to understand and 
implement. They are represented together with their impacts on user costs in Table 1. 
 
< Table 1 about here > 
 
(a)  Imputed rent equal to market rent, no supplementary deductions 
This tax system has no impact on rents. It taxes the pure profit of the landlord, so that his 
return on wealth is reduced just as if he had invested that wealth in the reservation asset. 
However, the tax increases the user cost of owner-occupied housing in proportion of the 
difference between operating a rental and owner-occupied dwelling. Thus, it reduces the 
user-cost wedge between owner-occupied and rental housing by making only the former less 
attractive. 
(b)  Imputed rent equal to market rent, same supplementary deductions for homeowner and 
landlord, no supplementary deduction for renter 
The idea behind this tax system is to allow the homeowner the same supplementary 
deductions as the landlord since he is taxed on the same rental income. The supplementary 
deductions make both rental and owner-occupied housing more attractive by the same 
amount. 
(c)  No imputed rent or supplementary deductions for homeowner and landlord; renter is allowed 
to deduct rent from taxable income 
If one does not wish to impute the market rent as implicit income for the homeowner, but 
allow him to deduct all operating and interest costs K
O, then equity and weak tenure  
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neutrality can still be obtained by letting the renter deduct the rent he pays from his taxable 
income. This tax system reduces the user costs of rental and owner-occupied housing, but 
the first a little more because the rent is higher than the production cost of owner-occupied 
housing. 
It is not necessary that the tax system reduce the difference in incomes in the proportion of the 
statutory tax rate t to be equitable or weakly tenure neutral. Many more conditions can be found for 
the stylised tax system, but they may be much more difficult to implement, if they need complicated 
calculation of the imputed rent and personalised conditions. They may also have undesirable 
secondary effects, for instance when supplementary deductions induce inefficient investment in 
some deductible expenditures or distortions in maintenance. Finally, the consequences of different 
solutions for public budgets ought to be considered when comparing tax solutions. 
One solution frequently advocated and applied in some countries such as Australia is to treat 
owner-occupied housing as a regular consumption good: no implicit rental income is imputed to the 
homeowner nor is he allowed to claim any deduction for interest paid or operating costs. In our 
model, that corresponds to T
O = 0 and can also be obtained by imputing income equal to the sum 
of interest and operating costs: R
I = K
O and D
O = 0 (eq. (32)). The user cost differentials for this tax 
system called (d) are shown in Table 1. It appears that the user cost for rental housing is lowered 
when the landlord is granted supplementary deductions. The user cost of owner-occupied housing 
is lowered by the amount of the tax on the implicit return on the homeowner's equity. Indeed, not 
including housing at all in the taxation of the homeowner's income amounts to exempting the 
implicit return on his equity, or, equivalently, to allow investment in a tax free good but only for 
owner-occupants. It is weakly tenure neutral for tenure choice if the supplementary deductions for 
rental housing are not so large that they more than compensate the tax advantage and the cost 
advantage of owner-occupied housing. If landlords are not granted any supplementary deductions 
and the operating costs of owner-occupied housing are lower than those of rental housing, then 
the tax system is still weakly tenure neutral because it simply makes owner-occupied housing even 
more advantageous. However, this is not equitable. It can be made equitable to any desired 
degree by adjusting the supplementary deductions allowed the landlord, but that requires 
implausible fine-tuning. 
Once it is recognised that treating owner-occupied housing like a pure consumption good allows 
homeowners to shelter equity, compensation can be sought in letting the renter shelter the same 
amount of equity. Such a proposal was made by Hendershott and Hu (1980). In that case, no 
supplementary deductions should be granted to rental housing. This tax solution is described in 
Table 1 under (e). It reduces the user costs of rental and owner-occupied housing equally, by an 
amount equal to the tax savings on the return on equity. As a consequence, it does not alter the 
cost differential between the tenures, so it is strongly neutral (and weakly equitable). 
In general, the tax system is strongly tenure neutral if T
O = T
LL + T
R  (eq. (26)). For the stylised tax 








                    = iW – (1+s)D
LL – D
R (39)  
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The second expression obtains when market rents are equal to costs as in equation (30). Equation 
(39) shows that strong tenure neutrality is not obtained by simply imputing for the homeowner an 
income equal to the market rent (R
I = R). It is necessary to take into consideration the difference in 
production costs if the tax system is to preserve that difference. Tax system (f) in Table 1 obtains 
strong tenure neutrality by imputing the market rent for the homeowner and offering the renter a 
compensating deduction equal to the differential in operating costs and supplementary deductions. 
This last tax system is strongly tenure neutral by offering the same tax rebate in both tenures. 
However, it does not obtain full neutrality as defined by Haffner (2000), that is also with respect to 
non-housing investment. Full strong neutrality is obtained when there are no supplementary 
deductions and when the homeowner is taxed on the implicit return on his equity. This can be 
obtained by adding that income iW to his other incomes and not imputing any rent nor allowing for 
any deduction related to housing (in particular, no deduction of mortgage interest), or by imputing a 
rent equal to the full production costs of owner-occupied housing, including the opportunity cost of 
equity (R
I = K
O + iW). This is illustrated as tax system (g) in Table 1. 
Defining the homeowner's taxable income from his housing equal to the implicit return on the 
locked-in equity, instead of computing an implicit rent and allowing him to deduct costs, is an 
attractive solution for countries that, unlike Switzerland, have only small or heavily regulated rental 
markets, as suggested by Hughes (1980). That is also the reference from which Laidler (1969, 
table 1) computes tax subsidies to homeowners. 
7. Conclusions 
In the case of housing, testing the equity and the tenure neutrality of the tax system cannot be 
limited to comparing the taxes paid by the renter and the homeowner. It is necessary to also 
include the taxes paid by the landlord, as the renter is the only 'consumer' to bear those taxes, 
through higher rent.13 It is equally necessary to take into consideration the costs borne by the 
homeowner in comparison with those of the renter and especially the landlord. The homeowner 
can typically 'produce' housing services at a lower cost than the landlord can: smaller management 
costs, maintenance costs, no loss of rental income. Those cost advantages compound the tax 
advantages when the implicit rental income is imputed very conservatively to render ownership 
quite attractive, provided that the landlord and the homeowner purchase the same dwelling at the 
same price and obtain the same credit terms. A premium for retail sales of dwellings – typically for 
condominium – and difficulties with financing the purchase can easily wipe out the other economic 
advantages of home ownership. Shorter holding periods that force homeowners to incur high 
transaction costs more frequently are also an argument against ownership. 
Tenure neutrality and equity do not always accord. For the tax system to be neutral with respect to 
tenure choice, that tenure which is more advantageous should remain so after taxes. For strong 
tenure neutrality, the financial advantage should even be preserved exactly. Equity, for its part, 
requires that those who benefit from cheaper tenure pay more tax, even if part of the advantage is 
thereby taken away. If households choose the tenure that implies lower user cost, whatever the 
                     
13   The rent could actually be lower than production costs, if rental housing is a tax shelter.  
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size of the cost saving, then an equitable tax system is also neutral. Obviously financial advantage 
is but one argument of tenure choice. A reduced cost advantage lowers the weight of that element 
of choice and the scale may tip for some households. In that case, the equitable tax system is not 
tenure neutral. 
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(a) Imputed rent equal to market 
rent, no supplementary 
deductions 





(b) Imputed rent equal to market 
rent, same supplementary 
deductions for homeowner and 
landlord 
R D







(c) No imputed rent or 
supplementary deductions for 
homeowner and landlord; renter 
is allowed to deduct rent from 
taxable income 





(d) No tax on housing for 
homeowner 
K
O  0 any 0  –sD
LL  –tiW sD
LL – tiW 
(e) No tax on housing for 
homeowner, tax sheltered equity 
for renter 
K
O 0  0 iW  –tiw  –tiw  0 
(f) Imputed rent equal to market 
rent with compensation for renter 
designed to obtain strong 
neutrality 



















(g) Homeowner taxed on implicit 
return on equity, no 
supplementary deductions 
K
O+iW 0  0  0  0  0  0 
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